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Abstract
Operational risk events in banks include extreme events with signiﬁcant losses being incurred and
with substantial impact on share prices. A pooling arrangement between banks that would be able to
reduce overall costs and reduce share price impacts would seem desirable, but one of the major
inhibiting factors to establish the feasibility of such a pooling arrangement is that statistical models
of these extreme events are difﬁcult to build with any reliability. This paper uses both quantitative
and qualitative analysis of operational risk losses for EU and US banks over the period 2008–2014
to establish the feasibility of creating a pooling arrangement between the banks and concludes that
such an arrangement might be feasible but would require compulsory membership of the pool and
capping of losses.
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1. Introduction
Li et al. (2017) analysed extreme operational risk events in US and EU banks from 2008 to 20141
based on data provided by ORIC International, where an extreme event was one where the recorded
loss was greater than $US100 million. The number and amount of the extreme operational risk
losses determined by Li et al. (2017) are summarised in Table 1.
Over the period 2008–2014, US banks incurred almost $700 billion losses from extreme operational
risk events, and EU banks incurred almost $200 billion losses. In terms of relative impact, losses over
$1 billion clearly have the greatest impact on proﬁts and extreme operational risk losses in banks
*Correspondence to: John Evans, Centre for Analysis of Complex Financial Systems, PO Box 363, Summer Hill,
NSW 2130, Australia. Tel: +61414643658. E-mail: jevans@pgeaus.onmicrosoft.com
1 ORIC International, https://www.oricinternational.com
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appear highly skewed which is consistent with the results in Ganegoda & Evans (2013). Just to put
these losses into perspective, the total assets of US and EU banks at the end of 2014 were $US 16
trillion2 and $US 23 trillion3, respectively, spread across 5,573 US banks and 3,972 EU banking
groups. Whilst the number of banks incurring the extreme operational risk events is then relatively
small and the impact on the banks’ asset bases is moderate, there is a much greater impact on the
share price and hence the reputation of the offending banks. Sturm (2013) considered the impact on
German banks’ share price of announcements of operational losses and concluded that there was
evidence of negative cumulative abnormal returns following both the announcement of the opera-
tional loss and the announcement of the settlement. Similarly, Fiordelisi et al. (2014) concluded from
a study of operational risk losses in US and EU banks between 1994 and 2008 that there was
substantial reputational damage following the announcement of the losses. Given the likely dis-
proportionate impact on each bank when an extreme operational risk event occurs, it may well be in
the interests of banks to develop a pooling or insurance arrangement for these larger losses to reduce
the impact on share price of the individual bank. Such a pooling arrangement may well be of interest
to regulators as signiﬁcant reputational damage to a bank may affect the stability of the banking
system. In this paper, we will only consider the feasibility of an inter-bank pooling arrangement, but
we recognise that insurers may well be able to offer insurance even if an inter-bank pooling
arrangement were not feasible if they have other uncorrelated insured risks. This paper is concerned
only with the actuarial issues around the feasibility of an extreme operational risk pooling
arrangement and not with the other issues such as regulatory and political feasibility.
2. Sustainable Pooling Issues
The main actuarial criteria for a sustainable pooling arrangement for extreme operational risk events
is that the expected frequency and severity of claims must be reasonably predictable within accep-
table bounds. To achieve this the pool needs a sufﬁciently large number of participants with iden-
tiﬁable and bounded potential losses and where the different risks are priced appropriately. In
addition, the feasibility of the pooled arrangement would be greatly enhanced if there could be
shown there was a low expected correlation of events across the banks, as this would allow a pricing
structure that would be advantageous to participating banks as their contribution to the pool would
be less than the losses potentially incurred by themselves. The pooled arrangement would then allow
a spreading of costs across banks and across time. In this paper, given the low frequency of observed
extreme operational risk events, and the actuarial importance of the correlation of extreme
Table 1. Extreme operational risk losses.
Number of events Losses ($US million)
Losses US EU US EU
>$1 billion 40 25 $654,147 $183,812
$500 million–$1 billion 64 11 $14,491 $7,515
$100–$500 million 23 24 $13,407 $5,590
Total 127 60 $682,045 $196,917
2 https://ycharts.com/indicators/us_banks_total_assets
3 European Central Bank, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150828.en.html and
X-RATES http://www.x-rates.com/average/?from=USD&to=EUR&amount=1&year=2014
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operational risk events to the feasibility of the pool concept, we will use two approaches to analyse
the historical occurrence of extreme operational risk events:
∙ First, we will determine the Pearson coefﬁcient for losses versus year of occurrence and bank name
versus year of occurrence to determine statistically the independence of the extreme operational
risk events. As the number of events being considered is relatively small, we will also observe the
number of banks with single-year events and multiple-year events as a proxy for the frequency of
events and observe for those with single events, the distribution of the events across the years as a
proxy for correlation.
∙ Second, given the relatively small number of extreme operational risk events that can be
quantitatively assessed with any reliability for determining future occurrences, we will use a
qualitative assessment and consider the underlying characteristics of the historical extreme
operational risk events to determine the drivers of the events as a means of understanding the
commonality of the drivers and hence the likely correlation of future events.
3. Empirical Analysis
Table 2 shows the Pearson Coefﬁcient for US and EU extreme operational risk losses against the year
of loss, and also the year of loss against the bank name which was determined by giving each bank a
unique numerical code.
The Pearson coefﬁcient indicates there is no signiﬁcant correlation between losses and years, nor
between years and banks, indicating that for the period analysed, losses are reasonably independent
within the constraints of the measure used and the relatively small data used. To test the reliability of
the Pearson coefﬁcients, the data were categorised into three periods, 2008–2010, 2011–2012 and
2013–2014. Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of the number of banks incurring multiple period
losses, and the average loss.
We have also analysed the distribution of single events across the three periods in Tables 5 and 6.
The results in Tables 3–6 empirically support the implication of the Pearson coefﬁcient and indicate
that during the period 2008–2014, around 75% of banks in the United States and the European with
Table 3. US banks, distribution of multiple events.
Number of periods
of losses
Total losses ($US
billion)
Percentage of
banks
Average loss per bank
($US billion)
1 $513 77 $12
2 $20 13 $3
3 $97 10 $16
Table 2. Pearson coefﬁcient.
Year versus loss Year versus bank
US 0.011 − 0.254
EU − 0.144 −0.044
An analysis of the feasibility
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extreme operational risk losses had a loss in only 1 period, i.e., most of the banks are not “serial
offenders”. In the United States, most of the losses by value have occurred in banks with losses in
only one period, but this pattern is not observed in the European where those banks with events in
two periods have the most losses by value4. The US banks with events in all three periods have larger
average losses than the other US banks and in the EU banks, those with events in two periods have
higher average losses than those banks with only one event. Overall, this analysis suggests that the
distribution of losses is heavy tailed with a few banks having both a higher frequency of events and a
higher severity of losses. The results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that by number of banks, there has
been a reasonably even distribution of events across the different periods, but the distribution by
value of the losses is highly concentrated.
4. Qualitative Analysis
Financial markets, and ﬁnancial institutions exhibit the features of a complex adaptive system which
do not lend themselves to statistical modelling (Daníelsson, 2008). Further, Mittnik et al. (2013)
counselled against placing too much reliability on both Pearson coefﬁcients and copulas when
analysing operational risk co-variability. To give greater breadth and depth to the analysis of the
feasibility of a pooled arrangement for sharing extreme operational risk losses across banks, parti-
cularly given the relatively small amount of data and the skewness of the extreme operational risk
losses, we have determined the drivers of the extreme operational risk events, using a process known
Table 4. EU banks, distribution of multiple events.
Number of periods
of losses
Total losses ($US
billion)
Percentage of
banks
Average loss per bank
($US billion)
1 $42 75 $2
2 $103 25 $13
3 $0 0 $0
Table 5. US banks, distribution of single events.
Period of loss Number of banks Total losses ($US billion)
2008–2010 7 $3
2011–2012 15 $477
2013–2014 20 $22
Table 6. EU banks, distribution of single events.
Period of loss Number of banks Total losses ($US billion)
2008–2010 3 $3
2011–2012 10 $21
2013–2014 10 $14
4 We have cleaned the data so that losses from an event are only recorded once, thus eliminating as far as
possible “double counting” of some events.
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as cladistics analysis. This analysis tests for systemic drivers that would suggest high correlation of
extreme operational risk events. Cladistics analysis was originally developed to assist biologists to
estimate the likely evolutionary path of animals based on their characteristics, but it has recently
been more widely used to understand how organisations work (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003), and how
cultural inheritance in social systems occurs (Matthews et al., 2013). In the ﬁnancial ﬁeld, cladistics
analysis has been used to study the drivers of signiﬁcant derivative events (Allan & Corrigan, 2013),
operational risks in banks (Li et al., 2017) and the World Economic Forum 2014 risks (Evans et al.,
2017). Cladistics analysis produces a hierarchical structure of the characteristics starting from the
characteristic that is unique to an event and moving through the characteristics that are common to
several events until it determines the characteristic common to the most events that is possible. To
construct cladistics trees, we used the maximum parsimony method, which is based on the theorem
of Occam’s razor which states that assumptions for explaining phenomenon should be as few as
possible so as to construct the tree that minimises the number of steps required to generate the
variation in the sequences from the common ancestor. Deﬁning the difference between two sequences
with length L,u= (u1, … , uL) and v= (v1, … , vn), then the non-normalised Hamming distance:
diff u; vð Þ= k j uk ≠ vkf gj j
and given sequences A of length L, with a corresponding tree T, the Parsimony Score is
PS T;Að Þ= min
λ
X
u;vf g2E
diff ðu; vÞ
Where the minimum is taken over all possible labels λ of the internal nodes of tree T.
To ﬁnd the most parsimonious tree, denote the value of the character for node v by c(v), and for each
leaf v:
S vð Þ= cðvÞ
For inner node v with “children” u, w:
S vð Þ=
S uð Þ\S wð Þ; SðuÞ\SðwÞ≠ϕ
S uð Þ∪ S wð Þ; SðuÞ∪ SðwÞ=ϕ
(
If SðuÞ∪ SðwÞ=ϕ, the parsimony score will be incremented by 1. By enumerating all possible trees,
the one with minimum Parsimony Score is the most parsimonious tree. The output of a cladistics
analysis is typically a tree structure that makes it easy to see the linkages that are estimated to have
occurred. Figure 1 shows a simple illustrative cladistics tree for a series of events E1–E8, and their
characteristics C1–C11. In this simple system, Event 1 has characteristics C1, C2 and C4 and shares
C2 with Events 2 and 3, and C1 with Events 2, 3, 4 and 5. C1 and C9 can be regarded as the most
systemic characteristics, i.e., they are the most common characteristics, whilst C4, C5, C6 and C8 are
the least systemic. Real systems usually are a lot more complex than shown in Figure 1 with several
branches between the systemic and least systemic or unique characteristics. Characteristics C1 and
C9 can be thought of as the “Tier 1” characteristics, and C2, C3, C7, C10 and C11 as the “Tier 2”
characteristics. In an analysis of ﬁnancial systems, the input is a list of events with their character-
istics derived from descriptions of the events either simply from observation or analysis of the
common words used in the description of the event, with the consistency index used to give comfort
that the characteristics chosen give a consistent output.
We have used cladistics analysis to determine the systemic drivers of the US and EU extreme
operational risk events over the period 2008–2014. A high degree of commonality and sustainability
of the systemic drivers of the extreme operational risk events across banks and across geographic
An analysis of the feasibility
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zones would be indicative that in the longer term, banks may well have similar events with a high
correlation of losses as the events are driven by common characteristics. The cladistic trees for US
and EU extreme operational risk losses over the period 2008–2014 are shown in Appendix A for the
more signiﬁcant groups5. A sample “tree” for the “US poor controls group” is shown in Figure 2.
The most systemic characteristics, i.e., those on the left side of the trees are summarised in Table 7.
The results in Table 7 indicate that there is signiﬁcant commonality in the systemic characteristics of
the extreme operational risk events across the US and the EU banks. Furthermore, the number of
systemic characteristics is reasonably small, indicating a signiﬁcant commonality in the major drivers
of extreme risk events. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Chernobai et al. (2011) who
E1
E2
E3
E4
E5
E6
E7
E8
C1
C9
C2
C3
C4
C5
C8
C6
C8
C7
C10
C11
Figure 1. A typical cladistics tree.
5 The full cladistics trees are available from the corresponding author.
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Figure 2. US poor controls group.
Table 7. Systemic characteristics 2008–2014.
US EU
Internal fraud
Legal issue Legal issue
Misleading information Misleading information
Poor controls Poor controls
Regulatory issue Regulatory issue
Software issue
Source: Li et al. (2017).
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found what we have called poor controls was also a signiﬁcant driver of operational risk events but
our study questions the assumption Chernobai et al. (2011) made of independence of operational
risk events, and also questions the reliability of quantitative analysis, such as the Pearson coefﬁcient
when analysing extreme events in a complex adaptive system. The cladistics analysis has a similar
objective to that of Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2016) who analysed covariates of causes of operational
risk events, but our analysis uses a different approach and importantly, does not make any
assumption as to independence of the risk events and has shown there is signiﬁcant dependence in
terms of the systemic characteristics of extreme operational risk events.
5. Network Analysis
Cladistics analysis identiﬁes the systemic characteristics of risk events, but a closer observation of the
trees in Appendix A will show that the systemic characteristic for a particular group of events also
occurs in other groups of events at lower levels of systemic importance. It is difﬁcult to easily identify
the overall extent of the inﬂuence of some characteristics from the cladistics analysis where the
characteristics occur in several groups of events. Network analysis is concerned with the totality of
the inﬂuence of characteristics on the risk events and compliments the cladistics analysis. Network
analysis of the ﬁnancial system is gaining attention with recent papers including Haldane & May
(2011) who looked at the systemic risk in the banking system resulting from interconnectedness,
Battiston et al. (2016) who argued economic policy needs interdisciplinary network analysis and
behavioural modelling and Joseph & Chen (2014) who looked at interconnectedness indicators as
predictors of potential ﬁnancial crises. We will use network analysis to indicate the overall degree of
importance in the network of the characteristics of extreme operational risk losses. Based on Bavelas
(1950) and Leavitt (1951) and the features of the network, we have used eigenvector centrality as the
measure of importance of the characteristics. Figures 3 and 4 set out the network diagrams for the US
and EU extreme operational risk events and their characteristics with the major connectivity6. The
red dots are the extreme operational risk events and the blue squares are the dominant characteristics
that are linked to the risk events. The more graphically central the characteristic, the more events are
connected to it.
The dominant characteristics from Figures 3 and 4 are summarised in Table 8 in descending order of
degrees of connectivity which measures the number of risk events connected to each characteristic.
The results in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that there is not much difference between the dominant
characteristics determined by the cladistics analysis and the network analysis, but the network
analysis has found that there are more common characteristics between the US and EU banks than
appears from the cladistics analysis. The combined result is indicative of there being signiﬁcant
commonality of the systemic characteristics of extreme operational risk events across the United
States and the European, but the network analysis indicates there is a reasonable range of causes of
the extreme operational risk events.
6. Feasibility of an Extreme Operational Risk Pool
In order for a pooled arrangement for sharing extreme operational risk losses across banks to be
actuarially sustainable, it is necessary that there are a large number of participants, the expected
6 The full network diagrams are available from the corresponding author.
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losses are reasonably determinable, and to be economically attractive, correlations of these extreme
operational risk events between the participants should be low. Our analysis shows:
∙ The EU and US banking systems do have a large number of potential participants.
∙ The number of banks with extreme operational risk events is relatively small, and the losses are
highly skewed, indicating that statistically based pricing may be difﬁcult.
Figure 3. US major connections.
Figure 4. EU major connections.
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∙ The banks with extreme operational risk events do not appear to be serial offenders, i.e., the losses
appear to be reasonably spread over the banks that have these losses, and by implication, extreme
operational risk events could occur for all banks.
∙ There are a small number of systemic characteristics or drivers of the extreme operational risk
events, but these main drivers occur also as lower level characteristics in other risk events, and the
overall number of signiﬁcant drivers is reasonably large.
These features of extreme operational risk events would suggest that it might be difﬁcult to convince
a large number of banks who have not incurred these extreme losses to join a pooled arrangement,
and for the pool to be feasible, regulatory compulsion may be required “in the interests of the
economy” to achieve stability of the banking system. On the positive side, the lack of serial offenders,
and the reasonably large number of signiﬁcant characteristics would suggest that sufﬁcient diversi-
ﬁcation within the pool may be achievable, but this is derived from the reasonably large number of
drivers of the extreme events and not from international diversiﬁcation, so country-speciﬁc pooled
arrangements could be feasible, at least in the United States and European. Pricing of the risks
involved would require capping the losses claimable due to the highly skewed distribution of losses
and the potential for unexpected losses.
7. Potential Pooled Arrangements
The analysis suggests that for at least the US and EU banks, pooled arrangements could be estab-
lished domestically, but smaller economies may need to establish pools across several economies
simply to have adequate numbers of participants. But even in the United States and European,
compulsory participation and capping of losses that could be claimed would be required to make the
pool economically attractive. Given the results of Ganegoda & Evans (2013), a charging structure
based on each bank’s assets would appear reasonable and simple to operate.
8. Conclusion
A pooled arrangement to insure EU and US banks would appear feasible and would be justiﬁed in
terms of the beneﬁts to shareholders from avoiding severe share price declines when extreme
operational risk events are announced and settled, and the advantage to the community of reducing
the risk of instability in the banking system.
Table 8. Dominant network characteristics for operational risk events
2008–2014.
EU US
Regulatory issues Legal issue
Misleading information Misleading information
Legal issues Poor controls
Poor controls Derivatives
Derivatives Regulatory issues
Insurance Complex products
Complex transaction Internal fraud
Money laundering Complex transaction
Internal fraud International transaction
International transaction Money laundering
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Appendix A
Cladistics Trees for US and EU Extreme Operational Risk Event Losses 2008–2914
“Legal Issues Group”
“Misleading Information Group”
“Internal Fraud Group”
Figure A1. US extreme operational risk losses, major cladistic groups.
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“Legal Issue Group”
“Misleading Information Group”
“Poor Control Group”
“Regulatory Issues Group”
Figure A2. EU extreme operational risk losses, major cladistic groups.
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